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Report of the
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REPORT

OF

THE COMMITTEE

OF THE

Massachusetts Reform Club


APPOINTED TO COLLECT TESTIMONY IN RELATION
TO THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

1898-1899

BOSTON

GEO. H. ELLIS, PRINTER, 272 CONGRESS STREET

1899



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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE.

The Massachusetts Reform Club, at the meeting held Oct. 14, 1898, adopted the following resolution:—

Resolved, That the Massachusetts Reform Club shall appoint through its President a committee of five, to be known as the "War Investigation Committee," and to consist, if possible, of two military men, two lawyers, and one business man, and that such committee shall undertake the work, so far as possible, of collecting evidence regarding the conduct of military affairs during the recent war with Spain.

Resolved, That the Treasurer of the Club be authorized to pay to said committee, upon its written order, a sum not exceeding \$500 from the treasury of the Club.

This resolution was proposed in consequence of the prevalent feeling that there was to be an investigation by a Congressional Committee, independent of the investigation by the Commission appointed by the President. It was suggested that the Massachusetts Reform Club, a non-partisan organization, seeking improvements in all departments of the public service, might well undertake to collect testimony from participants in the war, while their experiences were fresh in mind, for submission to a Congressional Committee when it should be appointed.

The President of the Club appointed as the Club Committee Colonel Charles R. Codman, of Boston, formerly of the Forty-fifth Massachusetts Volunteers; Corporal James B. Gardner, of Boston, formerly of the Forty-fourth Massachusetts Volunteers; and Messrs. Samuel Bowles, of Springfield; Robert S. Gorham, of Newton; and Charles Warren, of Dedham.

Colonel Codman was elected Chairman, and Mr. Warren Secretary of the Committee.

The Committee decided to confine its inquiries to members of the New England regiments and citizens of the New England States having knowledge of military affairs during the war. It accordingly prepared a circular (Appendix A), which was mailed to nearly seven hundred of the principal newspapers in New England, accompanied by a letter requesting the publication of the circular and asking that it be commented upon editorially. Many replies and editorial comments were received, nearly all of which were favorable to the investigation.

For the inquiry proposed a list of questions (Appendix B) was prepared, which was sent to the commissioned officers of most of the regiments from the New England States. A few of the regiments were omitted, as the Committee did not think it proper to send these questions to officers who were still in the service. The questions were also sent to some enlisted men, who, the Committee had been informed, could give valuable testimony; to many persons from whom letters concerning abuses and sufferings had appeared in the public press; to some of the nurses; and to a few others whose names had been suggested to the Committee. About eight hundred of these lists were distributed, and written replies have been received from about ten per cent. of that number.

As it now appears that no investigation by Congress of the conduct of the war is probable, the Committee has concluded that the publication of the important and significant portions of the testimony which it has collected is for the public interest. It is thought that this collection of selected testimony may have historical value, and it is hoped that it will prove useful in suggesting to both State and National authorities methods by which the military service of the country may be improved in preparation for future emergencies.

The Committee desires to emphasize, however, the point that it, at no time, attempted to carry on an independent investigation of its own. Its scope was simply, as a local

body, to collect testimony in aid of any future official investigation.

It has been deemed advisable to print the testimony without, as a rule, giving the names of the persons who made the statements. The original signed statements, many of them accompanied by affidavits, are, however, in the possession of the Committee, and will be held so long as there is a possibility of their being needed for any legitimate purpose.

The testimony submitted certainly suggests that there was inefficiency and incapacity, on the part of the commissary and medical departments, in furnishing to the soldiers of the nation proper nourishment and reasonable medical and sanitary care. It would seem also that the inexperience of many volunteer officers in the management of troops, and their consequent lack of appreciation of their powers and duties when exercising command, were causes of inconvenience and suffering; but it is evident that, however efficient regimental officers may be, unless the commissary and medical departments are composed, in all grades, of competent and humane persons, there will necessarily be great and needless suffering among enlisted men. The testimony should be read in the light of this consideration.

That there were instances of great devotion to duty on the part of many officers in these departments is not, and cannot be, doubted. It is confidently believed that there were very many such instances. But the remissness or inhumanity of a small number in these departments is likely to be more appalling in its results than any deficiencies in the other official classes of the service. The case of Boone, which has been presented in the testimony, would seem to illustrate this proposition.


The statements made by the witnesses as to the sanitary condition of the camps should be carefully read. There are many of these, and they do not disagree. That the most obvious sanitary arrangements were not made, at a

period when the subject of sanitary precautions is a matter of general interest and discussion, and when great advances have been made in the use of disinfectants and preventives, seems almost incredible. And yet, if the witnesses are to be believed, this is exactly what happened.

The Committee calls the especial attention of all officials, officers, and others interested in military affairs to the suggestions and recommendations made by various officers in their testimony as to means and methods of avoiding in the future the unnecessary evils and hardships of the past. It believes that much of their advice as to needed reforms will be found of great value. And it is this portion of the report which the Committee feels confident should be of permanent use.

Especial attention is called to suggestions made by officers on pages 21, 23, 26, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47.

CHARLES R. CODMAN,	} Committee.
<i>Chairman.</i>	
JAMES B. GARDNER,	
SAMUEL BOWLES,	
ROBERT S. GORHAM,	
CHARLES WARREN,	} Secretary.
<i>Secretary.</i>	



TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS.

The following statements are selected from those from members of the Second Massachusetts Regiment of United States Volunteers. This regiment was recruited in the five western counties of the State, chiefly from the members of the Second Regiment of State militia. It was mustered into the United States service at South Framingham, May 7, 9, and 10, 1898, and left Massachusetts May 12. It was stationed at Lakeland, Fla., from May 16 to 30, and at Ybor City, a suburb of Tampa, Fla., from May 30 to June 14. It sailed from Tampa, Fla., June 14, and landed at Daiquiri in the province of Santiago, Cuba, June 22. It took an active part in the Santiago campaign, and was in the battle of El Caney on July 1. The regiment remained in the near neighborhood of Santiago until August 12, and then sailed by the transport "Mobile" for Montauk Point, Long Island, where it landed August 19. It returned to Western Massachusetts August 27, and was furloughed for sixty days and mustered out of service November 3.

From Thomas C. Boone, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

[He died a few months after making this statement.]

I, Thomas C. Boone, twenty-two years of age, a resident of Springfield, Mass., being duly sworn, depose and say: I enlisted on the eighth day of May, A.D. 1898, at South Framingham, Mass., in Company K of the Second Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. The Second Massachusetts, having been mustered into the service of the United States on May 11, 1898, was on the afternoon of May 12 started South, going by rail to Newport, R.I., by steamer to New York, and by rail to Lakeland, Fla., where we camped for two weeks, going from there on May 31 to

Ybor City, near Tampa. On June 6, about 7 P.M., we received orders to break camp and be ready to move on board transports at a moment's notice. We did not receive orders to move until 5 P.M. June 7. We marched to a railroad train about one and one-half miles from Ybor City, and were moved by rail to Port Tampa, arriving at the latter place about 8.30 P.M. We slept on the pier all night, and the next morning went on board transport No. 24, the "Orizaba." The Twenty-second Regiment of regulars and some artillery were already on this boat. It was found that but one battalion of our own regiment could get aboard, and then the men were packed to such an extent that moving around was extremely difficult. The troops quartered on the decks had no possible means of protection from the sun and rains. On June 11 I received orders to report for duty to Major Maxfield of the Balloon Signal Corps on transport No. 22, the "Rio Grande." On this boat, besides the Balloon Corps of twenty-four men, were General Sumner and staff, and the Third and Sixth Regiments of cavalry. The water on the "Rio Grande" was of a brownish color, and every tank had an odor as though there were dead rats at the bottom. I could not drink the water. The water-closet facilities for something like 1,100 consisted of two troughs, one about three feet in length, the other about twice as long. To use one of them, it was necessary to wait from fifteen to thirty minutes on account of the number of men waiting there night and day. We could buy from the steward ice water for 25 cents a drink, lemons two for 25 cents. The cook would sell small loaves of bread for 25 cents apiece, pies for \$1.50 each, and soup for 50 cents a plate.

We landed at Daiquiri, province of Santiago de Cuba, June 22, having been on this crowded transport for fifteen days. About July 12 I was sent to the Siboney Hospital for examination, having such terrible pains in the lower portion of my abdomen that I could not walk. I was examined by a surgeon, who said I was ruptured. He said they could do nothing whatever for me, as they had no trusses or bandages. I was told by another surgeon that some cords on the left side of my abdomen were strained, and my right kidney had been displaced. These injuries were received while with the balloon detachment on July 1, and by being thrown out of an army wagon, which overturned while taking me to the Siboney Hospital. I was ordered to report to Major LaGarde,

chief surgeon at Siboney Hospital. I did so, stating my case, and was told by him that they could do nothing for me, that I would probably have to be operated upon, and that it could not be done there. I asked if he could not do something toward getting me to a place where I could receive attention, that the great pain made it impossible for me to walk or to sleep. He replied: "God damn you, get out of here, and don't bother me. I told you we could do nothing for ruptures, and that settles it. Clear out!" That night, having no place to sleep, and not being able to walk to where my detachment was camped, I went into one of the unoccupied tents, and laid down on a cot. I had been there but a few minutes when I was ordered off of the cot by Major LaGarde as though I were a dog. I slept on the damp ground all night, with no blanket. The cot that I had been compelled to leave was not occupied that night, as I was lying within sight of it all night. (Charles H. Knibbs of Company C, Second Massachusetts Infantry, of Worcester, Mass., was with me at the time I was ordered off the cot, and remained with me until August 5, when I left him at Fernandina, Fla. Hospital Steward Howes of the Second Massachusetts Infantry saw me at one of the hospitals, and knows of my condition at the time.) After that a detachment of the Ninth Infantry, who had been left at Siboney to look after the regimental camp, took care of Knibbs and myself. F. H. Boule of Company K, Second Massachusetts Infantry, was also with this detachment; and they will no doubt testify as to my helpless condition and inability to sleep, owing to the pains in my abdomen and a fever.* My lips were covered with sores, and my tongue and throat so badly ulcerated that I could neither speak nor eat for two days.

On July 18 I saw Major Maxfield of the balloon detachment at Siboney. He seemed surprised to see me, saying he thought I had gone to the United States. I told him I could have nothing done at the hospitals, that the surgeons said they had no trusses or bandages, and could not operate upon me there; also told him of Major LaGarde's treatment. He was indignant, and went to Major LaGarde's tent, and found him asleep. He awoke him, and insisted that something be done for me, or that I be given an order for transportation to the United States. I got the order, and applied to Colonel Humphrey for transportation.

* As Mr. Boule's testimony was practically a repetition of Mr. Knibbs's, it has not been given.

He gave me a pass on the transport "Aransas," and I had to pay 50 cents to get aboard of her. After reaching the boat, thirteen other soldiers and myself were informed by the captain of the vessel that no provision had been made for feeding us. For nearly two days we were without food. After that we received something three times a day. A correspondent for the *Chicago Record*, who was returning on the "Aransas," paid for one meal for us during the two days referred to. He purchased the meals from the ship's purser. During the trip over I had a severe case of bilious fever; but the physician on board could do little or nothing for me, owing to the fact that he had only a small quantity of quinine.

We were quarantined at Egmont Key, Fla., for six days, reaching Port Tampa on the evening of July 30. Sunday, July 31, I applied to the general hospital of the Fourth Army Corps at Tampa Heights for treatment or transportation to a hospital where I might receive proper treatment. I was refused admission on the ground that they had no facilities for treating my case, and was instructed to report to the adjutant-general of the Fourth Army Corps for transportation. I did so, and was told that he had no authority to furnish transportation. The adjutant-general ordered me to report to Colonel Coates of the Sixteenth Infantry at West Tampa for transportation. I did so, and was told by Colonel Coates's adjutant to report to Lieutenant Kopper, in charge of a detachment of the Seventy-first New York at West Tampa. I did as instructed, and upon reaching the last-named camp was so utterly exhausted that I fainted, and was unable to walk for several weeks after.

I realized that my condition was of an extremely serious nature. On August 1 I applied to a hospital at West Tampa, and, after an examination by the surgeon in charge, was told that they could do nothing to relieve me, but to return to my tent and lie down, and probably I would feel better in a few days. I had to be carried to and from the hospital. I concluded that, unless I received attention very soon, I would live but a few days. I wrote to my sister at Annapolis, Md., stating the circumstances, and on August 3 received a telegraphic money order for \$25, by the Western Union Telegraph Company, from my brother-in-law, Robert Moss, of Annapolis, Md., and a telegraphic message instructing me to come home immediately. This I hesitated about

doing. On August 4 the Seventy-first New York detachment, who were then taking care of me, moved to Fernandina, Fla., reaching the latter place Friday morning, August 5. Upon reaching Fernandina, I informed Lieutenant Kopper that I was growing weaker and was passing blood with my urine. The pain in my abdomen was intense. He advised me to see a physician. I went to a druggist, and the clerk told me that I was in danger of bleeding to death from my internal injuries. I returned to where I had left the detachment; but they had moved down toward the beach, a distance of about one and one-half miles. I was being driven around in a carriage. I realized that, should I find the detachment or a hospital, I would get no relief. I was driven to the depot in time to catch a train North at 5.30 P.M.

David Lewis Cobb, attorney for the Red Cross Society, office at No. 58 William Street, New York City, took charge of me on the train, and did everything possible for my comfort. We reached Washington at 9.45 Saturday evening, August 6. Mr. Cobb secured a carriage, and took me to the Riggs House, where he did all in his power for my comfort. Sunday morning, August 7, he drove me to the Baltimore & Ohio depot, and put me on a train for Annapolis, Md., telegraphing my relatives to meet me. Upon reaching Annapolis, I collapsed into a state of nervous prostration and weakness. Dr. George Wells, of that city, attended me, and pronounced my case extremely critical. I was in a state of semi-consciousness for eleven days. Dr. Wells afterward said that I would not have lived ten days longer, had I not received medical aid. After remaining at Annapolis under a physician's care for four weeks, I was instructed by the chief signal officer to report for duty at Washington Barracks, Washington, D.C., until my discharge should be received. I proceeded to Washington, and reported to Captain Gyger, of the Signal Corps at Washington Barracks, who, immediately upon seeing me, ordered me to the hospital, where I remained for five days, when I was granted special leave of absence by Colonel Dunwoody, of the Signal Office, to return to Annapolis, and there await my discharge. I wear two heavy bandages around my abdomen. One was furnished me by the Red Cross Society at Washington: the other I had made at my own expense in Baltimore, Md.

(Signed)

THOMAS C. BOONE.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

HAMPDEN, SS.

OCT. 29, 1898.

Then personally appeared the above-named Thomas C. Boone, and made oath to the truth of the above affidavit, subscribed to by him before me.

(Signed)

WILLIAM H. MCCLINTOCK,
Justice of the Peace.

From Charles H. Knibbs, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

On July 13 I was sent to the hospital at Siboney, Cuba, suffering from a rupture. At that hospital I saw Thomas C. Boone, formerly of Company K, Second Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers. Boone was suffering from internal injuries and bilious fever. His lips were covered with yellow sores. He could scarcely speak, and only with great pain and difficulty, and could scarcely walk. I saw Major LaGarde order Boone off a cot in an unoccupied hospital tent, and compel him to lie on the damp ground all night. The manner in which LaGarde spoke to Boone was such as I should not use in speaking to a dog. Boone could not sleep on account of pains in his abdomen. The next day Boone and myself went to a large tent occupied by a detachment of the Ninth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers; and the men in that detachment took care of us, giving us food, and allowing us to occupy the tent. I slept there one night; and Boone slept but little, if any, and drank a great deal of water during the night, and got up to urinate a number of times, being unable to hold his water. He was apparently in great agony. I came over with him on transport "Aransas," and did all I could to alleviate his suffering, which was painful to witness. I went aboard transport "Aransas" with him, we paying 50 cents each to get aboard. For nearly two days after reaching the vessel we had nothing to eat except some scraps of food which the cook gave us. The correspondent of the *Chicago Record*, who was on board, paid for one meal for fourteen of us at 50 cents per meal. After that we got food three times a day from the captain. I do not know what arrangement, if any, had been made. There was a doctor on board; but he had nothing but quinine, and very little of that. Boone was undoubtedly the most sick man on board. He slept

but little. My bunk was directly under his. One morning he told me that he had seriously contemplated suicide the night before to end his suffering, but the possibility of some day being able to bring to account the men who were responsible for his suffering caused him to change his mind. The doctor on board examined him a number of times, and said that he was ruptured and that his right kidney was displaced. I noticed that in examining Boone he would handle him as though he were a stick of wood.

Sworn to.

From a Captain, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

The first real evidence of neglect and carelessness that deserves criticism appeared on board the transport "Knickerbocker," when, as a result of potatoes decaying, an offensive odor was present at all times in the quarters of the enlisted men. This was the cause of some sickness. On or about June 19 the water, never very good, became unfit to drink; but the men were obliged to use it to avoid suffering from thirst. About the same time the food furnished the commissioned officers was of a kind that would be eaten only by men who were very hungry. All of the meat was putrid.

One company of the Second Regiment was landed at Daiquiri without rations of any kind. The line officers were without tentage or utensils of any kind, and were obliged to depend upon the enlisted men for these articles, and for several days were obliged to rely on the enlisted men for rations also. For at least two weeks the rations were scant and of poor quality. It was a difficult matter to secure any rations; and, when they were issued, it was at an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner. During this period no sinks were prepared. This may be accounted for in part by the absence of the necessary tools for digging. Medical supplies were very scarce, and the enlisted men frequently complained of the treatment received from medical officers and attendants.

On the third day of July I was attacked by the bloody dysentery; and during the night-time of July 5, while on my way to the sink, I fell, and received a spinal injury, and at this date I am still undergoing treatment for said injury. On July 6 I was

ordered to be taken to the division hospital, estimated to be six miles distant. I was placed in a regular government baggage wagon, drawn by six mules. During the journey the first sergeant of my company, who was detailed to assist me, aided into the wagon ten or eleven enlisted men found at different places along the road, who were suffering from bloody dysentery, sun stroke, and malarial fever. One of these men died the day following. Upon arriving at the division hospital I counted sixteen ambulances standing idle, and in the vicinity horses and mules were numerous. I was three days in this hospital. Assistant surgeons visited me twice voluntarily, at other times on demand only. The only food, drink, or medicine I received was what the sergeant procured for me. On July 9 I was moved by ambulance to the general hospital at Siboney. Here the treatment of the officers was good, but the enlisted men were neglected. I saw James F. Ferrier, a private of B Company, who was delirious as the result of a gunshot wound in the head, wandering at large, clad only in a shirt and a ragged pair of pants. On July 10 I was transferred to the hospital ship "Relief." The equipment of this ship was almost perfect, but its management was wretched. Lack of system was the principal trouble. During the eight days that I was on board this vessel six different physicians attended the patients. In the ward where I was placed, to each one you would, on request, relate your symptoms and expose your anatomy. He would look wise and depart, and rarely return. It seemed that, when a patient ceased to be a curiosity, he cut no further figure. During the day-time the nurses were very attentive; but during the night the nurses invariably went to sleep, and it was a difficult matter to awaken them. This was the cause of a great deal of unnecessary suffering by the wounded officers. Along with a dozen other officers on the 18th of July I was transferred to the transport "Hudson," thence to the general hospital at Fortress Monroe, Va. On the "Hudson" officers were compelled to pay one dollar and fifty cents each day for food. Part of the time this food was unfit to eat, and would be dear at any price. In the hospital at Fortress Monroe some of the patients suffered during the night-time by reason of incompetent and careless nurses. It was a common occurrence for nurses to sleep while on duty. I remained in this hospital from July 25 until August 2, when my friends removed

me to Bellevue Hospital in New York City. There officers and enlisted men both received the best of everything.

In answer to the repeated assertion that the volunteers became sick because they did not know how to take care of themselves, I submit the following:—

On the 10th of May, when this command was mustered into the United States service, we were equipped (in addition to our regular issues of clothing, etc.) with extra blue flannel shirts and double blankets for each man; and we carried with us a professional cook, who had catered for the company for fourteen years. To him, from our treasury, we paid up to the 1st of September \$40 per month and expenses. Our morning reports will show that from our entry into the service up to the second day of July we had present for duty seventy-seven men, the total number allowed by law to a company in our regiment. I think this will show that this command was careful and fairly well prepared to meet the ordinary hardships of a brief campaign.

Sworn to.

From a Corporal, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Rations: this is the point above all others which ought to be thoroughly exploited, that better things may be expected in future. The staple articles of diet in the travelling rations were hardtack, canned corned beef, canned "roast beef," canned baked beans, and coffee. The field rations actually supplied to my regiment included all the above, and in addition potatoes, onions, beans (white dried), rice, sugar, and, after the surrender of Santiago and the entry of our transports into the harbor at that place, soft bread and fresh beef. There were also spasmodic supplies of canned tomatoes. As to quantity, *excepting* the first two days on the island, June 22 and 23, when we were utterly destitute of food, I have no complaint to make. There was some shortage most of the time, and we almost never had the full rations allowed by the government and minutely set forth in the "Soldiers' Handbook" supplied to every recruit on enlistment in the regular army, but there was generally enough of something which would sustain life; and, if quality and suitability had been at all commensurate with quantity, the mortality rate would have been much less than it was, especially during the latter part of

our stay on the island. In detail, the rations, as I remember them, were something "fierce" at times, and of good quality at others. This applies to all, except that canned "roast beef" mentioned above. This was beyond question the meanest, vilest stuff ever used as a part of a soldier's ration. That which we had inflicted on us was of Armour's packing, and was "contract" stuff, put up in plain red two-pound cans, and labelled "Contract." It had the appearance of being the poorest parts of the animal, combined with some refuse tissue. The "meaty" portion seemed to have had the juices extracted previous to cooking. It was colorless, tasteless, and the fibre was badly disintegrated. It was also apparently boiled or steamed, certainly not roasted. The cans, after putting in the meat, were filled up with a sort of white grease of nauseating appearance. This meat, whether eaten from the can in its original form or utilized in the preparation of any "made dishes," was of very little value as a nutrient, and in my own case invariably produced digestive disturbances of a violent nature. I would cheerfully pull on the end of a rope which might have at the other end the man who was responsible for the quality of this abominable stuff.

The transports in which I had the misfortune to be carried to and from the island (Cuba) were models of what such vessels should *not* be. I had it on the authority of my regimental chaplain that Captain Betts of the good ship (?) "Knickerbocker," on which I sailed from Port Tampa to Santiago, said, "This boat is about as fit to carry troops as hell is to store gunpowder." And it was even so. The main trouble on the "Knickerbocker" was the utter unfitness of her hold for sleeping accommodations for the men. It was so dark and so devoid of any means of ventilation that in broad daylight I could only find my particular plank by feeling the posts with my hands, and counting the number to my bunk. Bunks were in three tiers. In the alleys between, two men could not pass. The atmosphere when the men were all down was simply terrible. I slept every night but one on the open deck, in defiance of orders. I would have slept at the mast-head sooner than in that awful hole. The transport "Mobile," which brought the regiment to Montauk from Santiago, was even worse in many particulars. The part of the vessel assigned as a hospital for the Second Massachusetts was so exposed to the weather that I have seen the bunks of the sick and

dying filled with rain-water after a sudden shower. The apologies for closets or sinks were in fearful condition, and utterly inadequate. Men — sick men — were compelled to stand in line to get a chance to use them; and, when overcome by nature, the result can be imagined. The deck was running with liquid filth; and this filtered through to the deck below, to drip on the poor devils who were compelled to eat and sleep there. My company lost four men from sickness, of whom three died on that horrible transport.

Clothing was all right, except that we couldn't get any until shortly before coming home.

It would seem that the foregoing statements made on my honor as an American soldier and a gentleman might be accepted. If any are questioned, I am ready to make oath to their correctness.

From a Corporal, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

About two weeks before we came home they issued fresh beef; but we were so weakened by starvation we had to bury it, as it gave us bloody dysentery.

Words fail to express my views on the "transport" question. First we were sent aboard the "Seneca" in Tampa Harbor, and the condition aboard her was frightful. We were kept on that ship about a week, crowded in worse than cattle,—down into the very bottom of the ship,—and everything simply reeking and stinking with filth: the seed of most of the Cuban fevers was sown on board the transports. After about a week we were transferred to the "Manteo," a little tumble-down Gulf steamer. There was about room for two companies aboard, so M and E Companies were sent aboard, and were comparatively comfortable until they sent two companies of the Seventeenth United States Infantry aboard; and then we found that we "had jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire." She drew only seven feet of water, and, when we struck the windward passage, she simply tumbled in all directions: all we could do was to just hold on. The large transports did not seem to roll or toss at all. In addition, we ran out of rations, and signalled for more, but without result. But the "Manteo" was paradise compared with the "Mobile" on our return. Words cannot do justice to describe the horrors of that "hell ship": between sixteen hundred and seventeen hundred

men, all more or less stricken with the fever, jammed and packed in places where a humane man would hesitate to put beasts. Men were dying all round us, and amongst them our own particular friends; and we could not help them. The food, even now, cannot be mentioned without a shudder. When you opened a can of "prime roast beef," it had turned black, and a horrible stench came from it. In our company we did not eat one row of hardtack all the way across; that is, about thirty-five hardtack.

It is a well-known fact that the First Brigade, in which was the Second Massachusetts, did all the trench-digging; and for a long time the only tools we had were our tin mess-dishes, knives and spoons.

From a Staff Officer, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

The canned roast beef was not nutritious. It seemed to be the residue of beef after the "extract" had been taken out of it to be bottled for the market. I did not see one can of corned beef.

Much could be said here. I shall refer only to the place assigned for the hospital on "Mobile." The deck above was temporary, not tongued and grooved; and the water dripped through and soaked the sick, eleven of whom died. I have known of men paying ten cents for a cup of hot water in which the surgeon had ordered medicine to be dissolved. I know one man by name who had to pay the steward ten cents for a biscuit which was really the government property. This ship was overcrowded, the quarters below deck being in such confusion that men failed in strength from nervous exhaustion.

No intrenching tools to speak of, four shovels for a regiment. Men dug with knives, bayonets, plates, etc.

This was atrocious. Kelley, of G Company, for instance, wounded through both cheeks, lay (according to Dr. Bowen) for thirty-six hours, unapproached, in a pool of water, and soaked by rain. He bled to death. The regiment hospital was in an old railroad station, a shack, depleted of sides, and poorly protected from sun and rain. The men lay in blankets, in the dust and dirt, till a short time before returning home. With temperatures of 104 and 106 they were fed on hardtack and pork.

Dr. Hitchcock (1st lieutenant) was incapacitated most of the time in the last encampment in Cuba. Dr. Bowen (major), with a tem-

perature of 102 or 103, was alone, until relieved by contract surgeons, two or three days before return home. Dr. Gates (1st lieut.) was assigned to the division hospital of the Fourth United States Infantry until nearly the day of our return; and then he almost immediately — certainly within forty-eight hours — took to his bed. The lack of surgeons was, beyond doubt, what killed the overworked surgeon-major.

(*Needed Reforms.*) Ability and experience in the quartermaster's department, and a commander general who will not move unless fully provided for all exigencies. The terrors of the army wagon used as an ambulance are not overdrawn by Mr. Bonsal in *McClure's Magazine* for December. I was an eye-witness to the arrival of these wagons at the division hospital July 2 and 3, and assisted in carrying the wounded into the enclosure called a hospital.

Instead of acclimatizing us for Cuba, by sending us to Lakeland, Fla., the result was to weaken us. We should have camped at a northern point, and sailed direct for Cuba. The converse is also true. Instead of invigorating us by sending us to Montauk Point, the change was too great, and undermined what little health was left. We should have been returned to a warm climate, and been brought home by degrees.

From a Captain, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Rations in camp good, excepting roast beef. Quantity ample.
Roast beef very poor.

Intr trenching tools were not in evidence. Our regiment had barely enough to keep twenty men busy.

From a Private, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Transports were in all cases overcrowded; that is, all transports that we sailed on, and in particular the "Knickerbocker," which carried a part of our regiment to Cuba. There was hardly any ventilation in the hold, where all men were ordered to sleep.

There were no intr trenching tools at all, when we began to dig intr trenchments before Santiago, tin cups, bayonets, and spoons being used. Tools arrived the next day.

From a First Sergeant, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Sinks in permanent camps were kept in poor condition, and on arriving at a new camp the dilatory methods used in erecting sinks was open to criticism. In my opinion, the first duty to perform on arriving at a new camp would be to erect sinks. In front of Santiago, one sink was erected for each battalion. The sink of the Third Battalion, of which — Company was a part, was erected at the extreme end, and was not in rear of the centre, as in former camps. The formation was G, D, K, and B Companies, and the sinks of this battalion were often as near as seventy-five feet from the tents of company where enlisted men were obliged to sleep. Watchfulness as to their condition was lacking; and repeated complaints resulted, in most cases, in no satisfaction whatever.

On our trip to the United States, on the "Mobile," the conditions were terrible. Two sinks, each capable of accommodating seven or eight men, were all there was for the entire brigade, consisting of the Eighth and Twenty-second United States Regulars and the Second Massachusetts. Drinking water was almost always warm, although there was a freezing apparatus aboard for cooling it; but for some unknown reason it was seldom, if ever, used. The sick men on the trip to the United States suffered from indifference and inefficiency of the medical department. As an example, one, Paul J. Kingston, a wagoner of B Company, was sadly neglected. Ten minutes after he died I was called to hospital, and was requested to have him removed to the stern of the ship, to be prepared for burial. On searching his clothes, I found that he had not been cleansed for several days, and that he was in a very vile condition from vermin and sores. Sick men did not seem to receive proper attention or nourishment, and were often obliged to pay exorbitant prices for food to the ship's steward.

When digging our first intrenchments, we were obliged to use bayonets, cups, pans, etc.; but afterward the proper implements were issued.

We all suffered from the idiotic blunders of some one, and unnecessary sufferings and hardships were the rule rather than the exception. A mule-wagon furnished transportation, and on our way to the hospital we picked up ten other soldiers by the wayside. Some were going to the hospital on foot: others had evidently started for the hospital, but became so fatigued that they were

obliged to seek rest by the side of the road. These were all enlisted men, and were suffering from sunstroke, dysentery, malaria, chills, etc. On arriving at the First Division Hospital, I saw at least a dozen ambulances there, which were apparently idle; and, on visiting the mule camps, I saw at least a hundred mules grazing under the trees.

I would suggest, in the first place, the abolition of the present system practised in this and many other States,—of making commissioned officers out of incompetent and inexperienced men, who have no other qualification than being “good fellows”; and when the occasion presents itself for these men to act as leaders and soldiers, as a rule, their lack of experience is always in evidence, and what dignity they display is forced on them for the time being. It is very discouraging to young men who have served years, and given their time and money to promote efficiency in the militia, to be subject to the orders of men who are their inferiors as soldiers, and, in some cases, as men. Soldiers are not made in a minute, and that was plainly evident during our campaign in Cuba. Officers who have posed as soldiers for years, and who would consider it an insult if insinuations were made as to their courage and ability, publicly demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the enlisted men of the regiment, their inability to cope with the conditions that existed. In saying this, I have no reference to my own company officers, and for them I could have nothing else than affection and respect. In answering the questions contained within this paper, I have tried to be as impartial and unprejudiced as my conscience would allow.

Sworn to.

From a Corporal, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

As for the transport ship, I cannot describe the filth and suffering. We were packed in so close that it was almost impossible to breathe, and hardly anything to eat; and what little we did have was rank, and the water it was impossible to drink. We offered 25 cents for a small glass, and then could not get it. In regard to intrenching tools, we had one pick and two shovels for each company. We had to use our knives, forks, spoons, and our meat plate.

From a Lieutenant, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

The rations issued to the troops while in the transports consisted of canned corned beef, canned prime roast beef, canned tomatoes, a small quantity of canned baked beans, hardtack, and coffee. The same rations were issued on the cars. There was always a sufficiency of such rations; but the prime roast beef was of a very poor quality, and a large number of the men were made sick from eating it. It was mostly fat meat and unseasoned. The men suffered from a scarcity of rations from the time they landed in Cuba until after the fall of Santiago. When our regiment was taken ashore, they were not issued any rations. Some of the more thoughtful ones filled their haversacks with what they could get in the line of canned goods and hardtack. Part of our regiment got ashore, on the 22d of June: the remaining companies were landed in the early morning of the 23d. June 24 we were issued four days' rations; but the next day (June 25) our men shared the contents of their haversacks with the men of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry — (Roosevelt's Rough Riders) who had — in the confusion of fight at Las Guasimas — thrown away their own rations. This generous act on the part of our men was a relief to the hungry Rough Riders, but it cut short their own supply. The next issue of rations was made on June 28. The issue was for two days. On the afternoon of June 30 we were ordered to cook one day's ration of bacon, to take with us on our advance to El Caney. The battle of Caney was fought July 1; and the men had nothing to eat that day, having left their haversacks with their rolls. In the early morning of the 2d boxes of hardtack and prime roast beef were dumped by the roadside, and the men were told to help themselves. From that on there was a scarcity of rations; and, while we were never obliged to suffer from hunger, there was never a time before the surrender when the men had enough to eat. The meat was issued during the hottest part of the day, and at times it was tainted so that it could not be eaten; and on more than one occasion the meat had to be buried.

The conditions on the transports were sometimes terrible. The ships were all overcrowded; and the men had to sleep in temporary bunks of rough boards in the hold of the vessel, where the heat was almost unbearable, and the air impure. Many of

our poor fellows were overcome, and in some instances were taken up on deck unconscious. Horses and mules died under like conditions. Sometimes vegetables, a portion of them rotten, were stowed away in the lower hold. We were on the transports from June 7 to June 22d,—just fifteen days. The suffering during this period was great.

The supply of intrenching tools was inadequate for the service required. Not more than two shovels and the same number of pick-axes were allowed to a company. The men had to dig trenches with knives, spoons, and meat-cans.

There was never at any time a sufficient supply of medicines, especially for cases of dysentery and diarrhœa.

The volunteers were sent into Cuba before they had a chance to become hardened to work attending a severe military campaign such as the Cuban expedition proved to be.

The scarcity of rations at the beginning of the campaign was due, as every soldier knows, to the poor condition of the roads and to lack of transportation. There should have been twice as many mule-trains as was provided. The farther we got from our base of supplies (Siboney) the more we suffered from want of rations.

(Needed Reforms.) Lastly, a regiment of National Guard should be commanded in time of peace by an officer from the regular army. All officers above him should be appointed from the regular army. The National Guard is a school for the soldier, and consequently should have for its instructors professional soldiers.

From a Sergeant, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

The quality of our rations was, for the most part, poor; that is, the bacon, canned roast beef, canned corned beef, canned beans, and fresh beef.

In the case of some of the regulars, at Camp Wickoff, they were camped on the lowest ground in the whole camp (on the beach); and during the heavy storms they and all their belongings were soaked through. There was no excuse for this, as there was plenty of room on the hills back from the beach.

In my estimation, from what I saw and heard from the boys in my own company, the hospital facilities at first were entirely inadequate; and, by my own personal experience, it was almost

impossible to get medicine. Had it not been for the "Massachusetts Aid" and our own personal friends, we should have fared hard for rations some of the time.

The conditions on the transports were, in regard to sinks, supply of water, and rations, inexcusable. The water was *horrible*, the stench from it hardly allowing any one to go near the casks (on the "Seneca"); and the only way we could drink it was to use it in coffee, and even then it was almost unbearable. The sinks were always more than crowded, making it necessary most of the time to wait your turn, which was very uncomfortable *generally*.

Our supply of intrenching tools was *very* limited; in fact, until our *last* camp consisted (for our company) of one shovel and the knives, forks, spoons, bayonets, and the meat-pans of the men.

Up to the last end of the campaign in Cuba the sick and wounded were cared for as well as possible, perhaps; but during the last few weeks hospital facilities were *very inadequate*, both in the supply of medicine and in the medical attendance. The hospitals were overcrowded; and those who were in the hospitals did not receive the care they ought to have, either in Santiago, the transports, or at Montauk.

In order to prevent future occurrence of all these things, put men at the head who are *capable* of running things.

From a Private, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

The canned meat was of a very poor class, especially the so-called prime roast. It was more like a box of axle grease than prime roast,—all fat and oil. The look of it was enough to make any one sick, even though they had stomachs like horses.

It seemed to me the camp (Wikoff) was not in readiness for us when we came there; and there seemed to be a great lack of rations, and also water, especially when we left our detention camp. When we went to our permanent camp, they had not all the tents up, and there were no rations, no water almost for over a day, without going a long distance for them, which was an impossibility, owing to the condition of the men who were unable to do anything.

The sick might have been taken better care of, but there were not enough trained nurses to look after them; and I am sorry to say the physicians were very harsh and cruel to the men,

swearing at them. On several occasions when a man who was sick did not come or take sick just at a certain time, he was obliged to be abused by the physicians, and sometimes by the so-called hospital stewards.

There were sufficient physicans; but it is a great mistake that the country is making, and has made, in not having any thorough-trained attendants or nurses, for the attendants were not capable of looking after the sick, as they never had any training for such an undertaking. The United States ought to have an organized hospital corps sufficiently large to take care of a certain army of men.

It ought to be understood who is head of the army in this country; and we would not have so much trouble in our management, and everything would be carried on successfully and with a great deal less confusion.

I am not saying anything but what is true; and would to God I could only tell all I saw! but it is an impossibility, and it is too bad that I have to say anything; and I hope this will never occur in our history again.

From a Captain, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Canned roast beef issued at times damaged so as to give offensive smell. Canned roast beef not damaged lacked the essentials necessary to satisfy hunger, and was anything but pleasing to the eye and taste. There was a general complaint against it, and a great deal of it thrown away. Fresh beef only fair in quality, accepted only a few times. Although issued, it was condemned as unfit for use, principally on account of exposure to the climate. Bacon generally good, but issued too often. Hard bread usually good except when exposed to the weather.

As I was only in the hospital at Montauk, can only describe the hardships as I saw them there. Not sufficient cot beds for the enlisted men August 19, and insufficient attendance and care. More physicians and attendants needed in the wards occupied by the enlisted men, and greater care taken to supply them with medicine, food, and drink. Officers well cared for. The hospital seemed to need a better head to direct it, general fault being found by physicians and nurses as to the manner of obtaining supplies necessary to care for the sick. It improved greatly by

August 25, when I left there; but there was lots of room for improvement then.

Transport ships inadequate, sleeping accommodations on the "Knickerbocker," No. 13 the worst kind of sweat-boxes, hot and oppressive, the men being in a perfect lather of sweat from the time they went below until they came on deck again. Very weakening to the system. Transport overcrowded, and kitchen facilities bad, sanitary arrangements bad. Returning from Cuba, transport "Mobile" overcrowded by reason of so many men being sick, water poor and hot.

Intrenching tools issued to each regiment; but at one time when before Santiago, while I was in command of a battalion of the Second Regiment, it seemed to me that we were somewhat deficient as to trenches, and, obtaining permission from the colonel commanding, the men of the battalion began to dig its trench with little or no appliances for the work in hand other than knives, meat-cans, dippers, hatchets, etc.

Insufficient clothing issued, and it seemed impossible to get requisitions filled complete. Issues of clothing and quartermaster's supplies were generally unsatisfactory to the men needing them, a number of the men being shoeless both in Florida and Cuba, awaiting the dilatory action of the quartermaster's department, requisitions being filed in ample time.

Wounded poorly cared for, transportation cruel and inadequate. Not sufficient ambulances or wagons for that matter, and completely demoralizing the theory of first aid to the injured.

Hospitals in the field poorly equipped, service poor for lack of experienced men as nurses. Details were made daily from the regiment of men to look out for the sick at the hospital, where, if contagious diseases were prevalent, the germs of disease, if not the disease itself, could be carried into camp.

Many of the officers of the Second Regiment, by their long experience in the militia of this Commonwealth, had a theoretical knowledge of warfare that materially assisted them in directing and caring for their men; but in some companies the officers lacked these essentials, the results being that the men suffered by reason of their apathy, lack of method, or ignorance.

To prevent future occurrence of such conditions, a strict adherence to qualifications necessary to direct and command should be the only issuance of commissions to any office.

Sworn to.

From a Sergeant, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Although we were on a ship whose hold was full of food, we landed in an enemy's country without even a hardtack. I do not know whose fault this was, but it was a grave mistake.

Coming home on the transport "Mobile," had the rations been good, they were not what men sick as we were needed; but they were not fit for well men to eat. The tomatoes were sour, the beef was tainted, and the hardtack burned. No provision was made for food for the sick men.

On transport No. 13 the men slept in the hold, which had no portholes or ventilation of any kind. Men were packed in there like cattle, and were not allowed to sleep on deck in the open air. The stench that came up from the hold was something horrible. The water we had to drink was not fit to wash your hands in. Men had to spend the day in the hold or sit on deck in the broiling sun; for we had no shelter whatever from the sun or rain. On the transport "Mobile" the hospital for the men was on deck, with nothing to shelter them but a few boards. Is it any wonder that so many of the Second Regiment died on that awful trip home?

While in the field, regimental hospitals were abolished. This was a grave mistake, for we were in a place where we expected a great many would be sick. The quickest way to explain about the sick men is to say that most of them had no care at all except what their comrades could do for them.

I do not think that there were enough doctors, and I know that there was not a proper supply of medicine.

From a Private, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Quality of hardtack fair, with the exception of the voyage home on "Mobile," when one case which we opened was covered with green mould, showing a ripe old age. Bacon was nothing but poorest quality of fat pork. In one instance one whole side was filled with reddish maggots. The worms were lively and in better condition than we were. Canned meat very poor. In all cases which came under my knowledge, it was three-quarters fat to one-quarter lean. One can which I opened was simply carrion of the most rotten variety; and at various times the tops of the cans

(after opening) were covered with green mould, showing the ripeness of old age or defective canning. In my opinion, if the meat had been in proper condition when canned, this would have been impossible.

On the "Mobile," coming home, we slept in the hold in hammocks. There were 1,200 men on board, and only room for 800. The food was worse than vile,—mouldy hardtack and musty canned goods. Even the strongest stomach rebelled. On our way from the hold to the deck, we were obliged to pass the kitchen, the stench from which used to make the men vomit. We had to drink coffee made from sea-water three or four times.

The first trenches were dug principally with knives, forks, plates, and spoons, as there was but one pick-axe and shovel for each company. After that we had five or six. These were in charge of quartermaster, who at times, either from laziness or incompetence, refused to inform the men where they were kept.

The medical supplies were totally inadequate. Often men could not get even quinine. Until Dr. Gates arrived at regiment, there were no cots at all; and men were obliged to lie on ground. When I was taken with fever, had it not been for Lieutenant Hayes giving me his own cot, I should have lain on the ground. There was a lack of competent doctors. Things in that respect could not have been worse. The three stewards were decidedly incompetent.

Have less red tape in government, and get rid of Alger, Eagan, etc.

Sworn to.

From a Private, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Above all, the canned roast beef was terrible.

Transports were horrible both ways. Trains were as good as could be expected. The meat we had on the "Mobile" was not fit for dogs: we could not eat it. Coffee, on two occasions, made from salt water. I spent \$10 on the "Mobile," and did not get a square meal: 50 cents for two biscuits; \$1 for a sandwich; 25 cents, cup of coffee; \$3 for a pie,—had to get something, or die with hunger. When first landed in Santiago, thirty-six hours without eating; no orders to take rations,—the boat loaded with it.

From a Sergeant, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

From my own experience on board, I hope I shall never be called to pass through it again. I was confined to the hospital. The first night I was left to lie all night on open deck, in a hard storm, being unable to help myself; and, if I had depended on the food which I received from the hospital, I certainly should have starved. But, having some money, I managed to bribe one of the waiters on the boat for food, and was compelled to pay a good price for it, but was willing to do it in preference to starving.

Condition of the hospitals outside of our own regiment I know nothing about. There was a great lack of cots and proper medicines.

Unnecessary suffering was caused, in many cases, by the indifference of doctors to look carefully into the sickness of their patients.

We ought never to go to war again with any country, no matter how weak she may be, until we are thoroughly prepared for every emergency which may arise during a campaign.

From a Private, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Rations consisted of bacon, beef, bread, hardtack, canned tomatoes, sugar, coffee, and potatoes in camp. These were generally of good quality, and made a very wholesome food. In the field, rations consisted mainly of bacon, coffee, prime roast beef, hardtack, and sugar. Of these the bacon was quite bad, and the coffee quite green. Sometimes the hardtack was quite mouldy. At no time were the men given their proper allowance of these. The prime roast beef was so rotten that scarcely any one could eat it. It was never salted. The beef would not keep over night without becoming so bad that one could not approach it.

On the transport ("Seneca") there were two sinks, each accommodating about eight men, for over one thousand men. It was necessary, when wishing to use them, to have to wait anywhere from a half-hour to an hour or more to get a chance to use them.

The Second was divided up on different transports: the First Battalion was on the "Orizaba," No. 24; of the Second Battalion, Companies E and M were on the "Manteo," No. 36, and

Companies L and I on the "Seneca," No. 5; the Third Battalion was placed on the "Knickerbocker," No. 13. I was on the "Seneca," No. 5. We were ordered to be ready to go on board the transports June 6, at a moment's notice; but, for some reason, the moving orders did not come until 5 P.M. June 7. At that hour we marched to the railroad, a distance of one and one-half miles, here boarded a train, and were transported by rail to Port Tampa. When we reached Port Tampa about 10 P.M. that evening, it was found that no provision had been made for our coming. So we were obliged to sleep out on the open pier all night. About 10 A.M. of June 8 we were marched on board the various transports I have named. The condition of the transport "Seneca" was almost hellish. The bunks were three tiers high, made of soft pine boards, with a crack in the middle of each bunk about four inches wide. They were very loose, and some fell down after we struck heavy seas. The bottom bunk was hardly eight inches off the floor, and the top one was about a foot below the floor of the next deck. The air was very foul and close. The floor was covered with about half an inch of dirty, black stinking slime, which stuck to one's shoes like glue. At night the men all sought the upper deck as a place to sleep, because the stench of this fine place which was given us to sleep in was unbearable. There were two water-closets, each large enough for about eight men, furnished for the use of one thousand men. These were crowded night and day. The water on board the transports was all the same. It was that sickening water from those Tampa wells, and, to make it more healthy, sulphur was dumped into it. Nevertheless, the water was put into wine barrels; and, in fact, any barrel which had never been washed out served for carrying the stuff. Its stench was so foul that it almost made a man vomit to look at it, to say nothing of drinking it; and, to add to all this, one-half the upper deck was reserved for the officers, so the men were packed in like a lot of sheep. There were not half enough life-boats on the ship, and even these were not properly provisioned.

The Second Regiment was not supplied with intrenching tools until nearly all the intrenching work had been done. The men were obliged to use their knives, forks, and tin plates to dig with.

The wounded were transported in those rough army wagons to the rear. As General Shafter had forgot to bring any ambu-

lances with him, it was necessary to use these wagons. Before the fight, each company was furnished with eight first aid bandages. I do not know why there were not more, except, as Dr. Hitchcock told me, that the requisitions for them were not honored. In the regulars each man had a first aid bandage.

Sworn to.

From a Captain, Second Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Care of wounded and sick in field hospitals was very bad. Not enough doctors or nurses. Very little medicine and few tents to put wounded in. They had to lie on the ground exposed to sun and weather. Medical officers did all they could, but was not enough of them.

The following statements are selected from those from members of the First Regiment, New Hampshire U.S.V. This regiment mustered into the service from May 7 to 13, 1898, and were encamped on State grounds at Concord. Left for Camp Thomas, Chickamauga, Ga., May 17, 1898, and on August 26 were sent to Camp Hamilton, Lexington, Ky. Reached Concord on return September 8, and mustered out October 31, 1898.

From a Captain, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

Instructions were to have all water thoroughly filtered and boiled, but they were not at first carried out on account of lack of water and facilities.

Clothing was all right, but hard to get.

The sick were not properly cared for on account of lack of supplies and surgeons. Two of our surgeons were taken away, leaving only one for the regiment.

Hospitals were not large enough. There were not enough cots or medicines, but, with the facilities at hand, as good as could be expected. This is the regimental hospital.

Lack of medical officers and attendants.

There was a scarcity of water which seemed wholly unnecessary.

My recommendations are that regular army officers or men of

experience be placed at the head of the different departments, so that needed supplies may be obtained, as provided by the United States Army regulations.

In my estimation, it is poor judgment to make the soldiers arise at quarter past four in the morning, and work hard until seven o'clock at night.

From a Staff Officer, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

My general impression is that incompetency and lack of preparation were the chief causes of the suffering and sickness of our men. The sanitary conditions at Chickamauga were very bad; but I do not feel inclined to charge our regimental officers with wilful neglect, for I think they did the best they knew how to do. They were as incompetent, but no more so than the brigade and division officers.

From a Lieutenant, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

Rations were of fair quality and of sufficient quantity, except the first two weeks in Chickamauga, which was owing to the inexperience of the commissaries of the regiment and brigade.

When we first arrived in Chickamauga, were obliged to dig shallow wells to get drinking water. Later on it was hauled from springs outside of the park by the company's teams. In July an order was issued,—I think by our colonel,—making the men filter and drink the creek water, while the spring water was used for cooking. The filters soon got clogged, and became useless; and it was this impure water that was the cause of much sickness. Many times we were without water for a whole day, and caused much suffering.

Our camp was on a rocky ridge, where it was impossible to dig a sink more than three feet deep, and had to dig them wherever we could. Sometimes they were too near the kitchens, and at others a long distance from the company. They were often alive with maggots, and the swarms of flies flew from sinks to the kitchens.

The care of the sick in Chickamauga was not what it should have been. In our regiment there was only one doctor on duty, and at one time we had nearly three hundred sick men. The regimental hospital was a poor affair, and could care for only a

fraction of the sick men. The nurses were men taken from the ranks, with no experience. I could tell you much about the care of the sick, but it is too tedious to write it all. It is the one thing for which our government ought to feel ashamed.

From a Captain, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

Hospitals in regiment poorly equipped.

Medical officers in First New Hampshire of best, and did good service until removed to division hospital, where it was impossible for regimental surgeons to do work.

From a Staff Officer, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

When the regiment first reached Chickamauga, nothing was said as to condition of drinking water in the park. The officers and men drank from the creeks without any knowledge as to the composition of the water. It being very much saturated with lime, it immediately produced a bad effect on systems accustomed to pure New England water. I think it safe to say that over 90 per cent. of the officers and men were taken at once with a severe diarrhœa. Nothing was done in the way of providing for better drinking water until it was suspected that typhoid germs might be in it. Then orders came to boil all drinking water, which was then brought in barrels from springs, several miles away. At first the supply was not sufficient. Perhaps the men were too careless, and wasted a part of it. At any rate during the time I was a private I suffered for the want of water, and drank from streams, from which orders had been given that no man should drink. At one time before going on guard duty, I went over to the Vermont regiment, and, knowing Surgeon Lee, received permission to fill my canteen from their supply of water. The order to boil the water was not enforced in any company, and the order practically amounted to nothing.

It is hard to lay the blame anywhere regarding the sinks. They were removed far away from the company grounds. The greatest trouble in our regiment was that they could not be dug deep enough in most places. We were on very rocky ground. The severe rain-storms kept the sinks half filled with water, and at times they would be filled clear full. Maggots were bred by the bushel. The sinks were all extremely nasty.

When the fever cases began to multiply, the hospitals were not large enough for such a number of sick men. The care of the men was not of the best possible. Saying nothing against the majority of surgeons, the nurses did not know their duty. They were a lot of men taken from the regiment, many of whom were of the class that were too lazy to drill, and thought they might find it a little easier in the hospital. I was a frequent visitor to the hospitals; was called there many times in the night, and have often wished that this government might supply a better lot of men to take care of the sick. In our own regiment we had a competent set of surgeons,—Drs. Burns, Greeley, and Day, with a surgeon for a steward, Dr. Congdon. Dr. Burns was taken sick with the fever before I was connected with the regiment, and was unable to give the regiment any service. Dr. Day was transferred to the division hospital before my enlistment, leaving Dr. Greeley only in the regiment. He was faithful in the discharge of his duties, but had more than one man could do. He was going night and day. At times he had to treat over two hundred men a day. No one can begin to do justice to such a number.

If I were to make any suggestions to prevent future occurrence of such conditions, I would say that the government made a sad mistake in placing so many men in one place and keeping them there so long. If every regiment had been kept in the State in which it belonged, and ordered out as they were needed, much suffering might have been avoided. The longer we remained in the South, the weaker we became as a regiment. We were in better condition to go right into Cuba from the State of New Hampshire than we were at any time to go from Chickamauga Park. One great drawback to a volunteer army is the lack of competent officers. Our field and staff officers understood their duties very well. I feel safe in saying that no colonel of the volunteer army understood military duties better than did our colonel; but the line officers, as a whole, did not know their duty, and the non-commissioned officers knew scarcely anything about what was expected of them. Let us have good officers; and they will make such a push that wrongs will be righted, and then all negligence will be punished, and will not be repeated over and over again.

Sworn to,

From a Surgeon, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

The whole system of caring for the sick in camp was bad, the fault being in the *general plan*, and not in the medical officers. With the three surgeons of the regiment at a regimental hospital, the sick would have been cared for very satisfactorily; but our surgeon was detailed to a division hospital, then I was assigned to duty in the ambulance corps, and one assistant surgeon was left in charge of the regiment. He had his hands much more than full, and much complaint has been made by the soldiers of the regiment regarding medical attendance.

Hospitals were much crowded. One could not walk through a ward without brushing against the beds on either side. Nurses were inefficient, did not pretend to be anything else; for they were young fellows, sent against their will, usually, to take care of the sick. It seemed to be an idea of some superior medical officers that any man was competent to nurse the sick.

As to the number of medical officers. It was sufficient, under a suitable system; but if (as was the case) six surgeons were detailed to the ambulance corps from a division, and a hospital quartermaster and hospital superintendent taken from the regimental surgeons, the number was insufficient. The writer, after leaving his regiment July 1, did no actual medical service, excepting for a few days at Lexington, being occupied all the time in the ambulance corps.

Medicines. None could be obtained from medical headquarters for weeks after we reached Chickamauga. We bought many of our drugs at first, in Chattanooga; and more were sent from New Hampshire.

As to hospitals, let each regiment look after its own sick and wounded. In the hurry and excitement of war, large institutions, like division hospitals, are much more likely to be mismanaged than smaller ones; for the system must be more elaborate to make them a success. Have women nurses who know their business, instead of private soldiers, to care for the sick. Abolish the red tape as to descriptive lists, etc., necessary to admit a soldier to the hospital. Select camps with intelligence, and furnish a pure water supply, that need not be carted from one to four miles to the soldiers, as was the water for the First New Hampshire.

From a Field Officer, First New Hampshire, U.S.V.

Sinks were not supposed to be used when they were full to within eighteen inches of the surface. On account of solid rock some could not be made that deep. The distance from the company kitchen from fifteen to a hundred yards away.

It became my duty, as division officer of the day, to inspect the whole division sinks, and other things which came to my notice, for nine regiments, Third Brigade, Third Division, First Army Corps, and found sinks in a very filthy condition, the soil being hard red clay, and nothing would soak through it, and as quick as there came a shower the contents would be washed about the camp. There should be lime provided for such sinks in a camp. I think the doctor of the regiment wanted lime, but could not get it, as some one higher made a remark that it was not used in the regulars.

I noticed within fifty yards of one large hospital where a dead mule had been buried: only head and legs appeared to be buried, and dirt piled up over the body. The flies and smell would almost kill a person.

These statements are selected from those from members of the First Vermont Regiment of United States Volunteers. This regiment was mustered into the United States service at Camp Olympia, in Vermont, on May 16, 1898, and left the State May 21. It arrived at Camp George H. Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga., May 24, and remained there until August 19, when it returned to Vermont, and after a furlough was mustered out of service about November 1.

From a Captain, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Sinks were placed as instructed, but could not be dug of sufficient depth, and the soil was so hard nothing would sink into it. During heavy rains the sinks would fill up, and contents run over. They were much too near, as there was an odor from them at all times. Not enough disinfectants used. The condition of the

soil was such that it was impossible to keep them in proper condition for the length of time we remained there.

Clothing good except shoes.

The sick were not given the care they needed; could not get proper food. Regiment short of surgeons and hospital attendants.

Hospital too small,—much too small; medicines insufficient at first, but better latter part of the summer.

Number of medical officers much too small, and unacquainted with the care of men under such circumstances as they were sick there. Did the best they could, but could not possibly care for the number that was sick some days.

The worst evil was the keeping of so many troops on the same ground for so long a time. We did not move during this entire time. The vicinity was full of sinks, and the air was awful during the last of August. If we could have been moved a few times during the summer, if only a few miles, I think it would have prevented much sickness, besides being much better for the men. I think the great lack in this war, from personal observation, was in the medical department, insufficient in number, and not experienced in the care of sick in the field or camp. I did not lose a man from my company during the whole time, and none have died since, but it was the only one. Twenty-seven died in the regiment.

Sworn to.

From a Field Officer, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Sinks were the most difficult problem we had to contend with, as they could be dug on an average of only about two feet deep without blasting the strata of rock which laid under the hard clay surface of our camp.

Most of the clothing provided was serviceable; but some was very poor, especially shoes. We were clothed as soon as any regiment which had a large number of ununiformed recruits, but the delays were great; and many uniforms had to be made over by our tailors on account of inability to get proper sizes.

The sick were well cared for until division hospital became so crowded about the middle of July as to render accommodations inadequate, and the work too hard for surgeons and attendants.

Our regimental hospital was well equipped, but through private

contributions; but we were supposed not to know it, as all sick, except the "sick in quarters," were ordered to division hospital. This was fairly well equipped, though partially by private funds; and during a part of the time the accommodations were inadequate. Our medical officers frequently had to buy medicines which they considered necessary.

I observed personally no incompetency among the medical officers, but we suffered from lack in numbers. The attendants were, as a rule, painstaking, but lacked in experience, many of them.

Large camps maintained for any considerable time have always been productive of disease, no matter how much attention was paid to sanitation, and never should be allowed unless absolutely necessary. The assembling and keeping of large bodies of men at Alger and Thomas during the past summer repeated history; and, since they were abandoned and small camps established, the health of the men has steadily improved, if all reports are to be credited.

The water supply at Camp Thomas was for a time utterly inadequate; and, after the pipe line was laid, the supply, though sufficient, was most unwholesome, if not actually polluted, rendering tedious processes of boiling and filtering necessary. Camps should always be selected with a view to a sufficient supply of pure water.

Both for the health and morals of the men, camps should frequently be moved. This was not done, and applications for permission to change locations were denied until too late to prevent the large amount of sickness which developed.

Regimental hospitals were abandoned, and division ones were substituted as an experiment. The theory was excellent, but the medical department had no established system whereby to work out the theory; and confusion was the result. It is probable that, under an educated and experienced practical management, the division plan would be preferable; but, to make it so, the medical and hospital staff of the army will have to be largely increased and thoroughly educated in field work.

Sworn to.

From a Captain, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Drinking water. For some time after our arrival no instructions, then ordered not to drink water from local springs. Water was hauled from three to six miles, and was always scarce, so that men were forced to drink any water they could get. Water mains and pipes were not laid near our brigade (Third, First Division, Third Corps) for some weeks, and all water was at that time carried from one to three miles.

Great difficulty in securing clothing. Men unfit to go where they could be seen. At one time about 20 per cent. of regiment excused from duty from lack of shoes. First issue of clothing good, the rest generally very poor and shoddy. Have seen trousers go to pieces in eight to ten days. First issue of shoes very poor, many worn out in two weeks. All sorts and styles. Second issue generally very good.

One surgeon attached to staff Third Brigade, First Division, Third Corps, one sent to First Division, Third Corps, Hospital (detail), leaving one surgeon to care for the entire regiment, which was impossible. Hospital tents old and very leaky. Heard surgeons complain that their requisitions for medicines were not filled. Men afraid to go to division hospitals, and would not admit of illness, if could possibly avoid it, for that reason. All hospitals overcrowded and attendants overworked. Am positive that there were cases of neglect in First Division, Third Corps, Hospital on part of surgeons. Men had no confidence in certain of our regimental surgeons, whom they did not think qualified. Had to send food to men in division hospital from camp, even plain food, to say nothing of delicacies. Have seen closets at First Division Hospital overflowing and allowed to stand. Tents crowded. Am positive that typhoid was frequently reported as malarial fever.

Have no National Guard office above rank of lieutenant-colonel, or at any rate have all colonels appointed by President from regular army, same as details to colleges. Have all State adjutant-generals and quartermaster-generals appointed from army, and for assistants have guardsmen, who would thus learn the duties of the position. Quartermaster-general should also act as ordnance officer, and have assistants for that department. If impossible to secure a United States army officer for colonel of

each regiment in time of peace, have only a lieutenant-colonel; and then in time of war a United States officer can fill the vacancy without any guardsman — who has spent years in hard work — being thrown out of his position.

Assign to each State a certain number of troops to be held at all times in readiness, in no case less than a regiment. Let general government furnish armory and full equipment; and State pay, transport, and ration troops while in State service. All departments, books, and regulations to be same as U.S.A. Hospital Corps, and medical department to be assigned in same way. Require of these troops at least twenty days' service, consecutive, and at least fifteen of that to be in large bodies for "field operations." During the year at least two hundred rounds target practice per man. In States where towns are small, have enough companies so that, consolidated, they will form the necessary organization at war strength. Officers to be retained by seniority. Examinations for commission in National Guard to include care of troops in field, intrenchments, cooking, making requisitions to all departments, and tracing their course until honored; reports of boards of survey, court-martial, etc. Questions should include Wagner text-books. Age of enlistment, eighteen to fifty; and not over 5 per cent. should be under twenty.

From a Lieutenant, First Vermont, U.S.V.

I was accidentally shot in left limb about two inches above the knee, the ball taking a downward course and coming out near the top of stocking. This happened on the seventeenth day of May at about noon. I was carried directly to the hospital tent, which was located a short distance from my quarters, and remained there until the following day till about eleven o'clock, making about twenty-four hours. I had nothing done for me other than a few hypodermic injections to ease my pain: the wound was not even washed out or cleansed in any way. I was then removed to a civilian hospital, a short distance from our camp. After arriving at the hospital, an army surgeon immediately placed my limb in a plaster of Paris cast without any opening whatever, there being no padding under the cast, and also wound it so tight as to stop all circulation, the cast being on from Tuesday to Friday of the same week, at which time I noticed my toes had begun to get cold. I

then called the attention of the chief surgeon of the hospital, who immediately cut the cast off, he at once finding out that blood poison had set in. My limb remained in this condition from the twentieth day of May until the eighth day of June, when the line of demarcation formed, and my limb was amputated. Before amputation took place, I had a consultation of doctors, and found that the cast was the cause of my losing my limb.

I do not think that army surgeon competent of holding the position which he held, and I honestly and faithfully believe it is the direct cause of my losing my limb.*

Sworn to.

From a Captain, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Instructions and orders given to keep sinks covered. The soil was such that the ground would not absorb the liquid, and a heavy rain would cause them to overflow. They were kept well covered, but could not be kept from the overflow.

Main hardship, want of pure drinking water.

Clothing good, delayed in getting outfit as soon as could be wished. First issue of shoes poor.

Some of the sick did not receive the attention that they demanded. Hospitals at first inadequate, after a time were better. Supply of proper medicines at first faulty: no ice, no milk; no liquors for stimulants.

From a Lieutenant, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Drinking water poor.

Think that sick were not very well cared for.

Lack of competent nurses.

I think if we had had a regimental hospital large enough to take care of all of our sick, and all of our surgeons to attend them, we would have had better results, and some way of getting medicines when we wanted them.

From a Surgeon, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Sick received the best attention one surgeon, one hospital steward, and one private could give the sick of an entire regiment.

* There was enclosed with this statement an article from a local paper giving essentially the same facts.

Where twelve men (I believe) are allowed for a regiment, I had two stewards (one always sick) and one orderly. We all overworked, and simply could not give the amount of time to individual soldiers that the United States government should have furnished to volunteers.

Three old tents furnished for regimental dispensary until about July 10, I believe, when we obtained three new hospital tents. About July 20 my hospital steward and orderly were both taken sick, leaving me alone. I used convalescents to help. Requested the division surgeon to send me nurses from hospital corps. After two days he sent me two men, who were transferred to the ambulance corps as *teamsters*. They were good men in their own business, but did not know how to take a temperature. Had to do with these until I was taken sick. No cots furnished by United States. No sheets, mattresses, pillows, or cases. W. S. Webb furnished all of these, liquid diets, and over 50 per cent. of medicine used. Without his fund at my disposal the suffering would have been something terrible.

Have the commanding officer of a volunteer regiment an officer of the regular establishment with good experience when he undertakes his duties, and have the element of State politics left out of the management of volunteer regiments.

From a Captain, First Vermont, U.S.V.

Rations were sufficient and of fair quality after the first four weeks. For the first four weeks they were inferior, and with inexperienced cooks some companies suffered for a while in my regiment.

Regiment was inspected once each month by a division officer. Rations were not inspected, to my knowledge, at any time.

In regard to water, I sent teams each day after the third day in camp to what is known as Claw-fish Spring, some two miles distant, for drinking water until July 1, or thereabouts. After that date they went to Alexandria Spring, some four miles distant. We drew from twenty-four to thirty-six casks each day for the regiment, and after July 1 water was boiled.

Our camp was on a "shale" of rock. It was almost impossible to dig for sinks; and being in close proximity to highway and other regiments and division hospital, hence our space was

very limited and not over one hundred and fifty feet from kitchen to sinks.

Clothing was of inferior quality as compared with goods formerly furnished government troops, and supplies very limited as to sizes, and for quite a little while were unable to get any, as there was none at the depot. In fact, requisition of June 8 was not fully honored on August 18.

In regard to medical officers our regiment suffered to a certain extent. We took three very good surgeons when we left Vermont. On our arrival in the park one of the surgeons was detailed to brigade headquarters and one to division hospital as soon as that was established, thus leaving only one with regiment to vaccinate, inspect, make reports, and attend all sick calls, while there was work enough for three men.

In conclusion, I will say that the very first thing to be looked after on arrival in camp are the sinks. Those should be thoroughly policed, and disinfectants freely used. Second, hospitals should be established immediately, and be fully supplied with all necessary medicine, so as to be able to treat any malignant cases as soon as they appear. Third, I think all troops should be frequently moved, if only a short distance: thus a change of ground before the camp becomes fever-stricken. And, in conclusion, I believe troops should be prohibited, as far as possible, from purchasing eatables from hucksters and pie-peddlers.

From a Second Lieutenant, First Vermont, U.S.V.

The issue of clothing was very slow, whether on account of scarcity or not I do not know.

The attendants or nurses were mostly inexperienced, and in some hospitals they were overworked.

I did not notice any hardships that could be avoided, except keeping so many soldiers in one place, as at Chickamauga, for so long a time. Soldiers should not be in camp in one place over six weeks at one time.

Would suggest that each company should have at least one experienced cook, and also would very strongly recommend that experienced nurses be provided for all hospitals,—female nurses, when possible.

Sworn to.

From a Surgeon, First Rhode Island, U.S.V.

In the early days in camp life the patients in hospitals suffered greatly from lack of proper supplies. These conditions improved as time went on.

The hospital tents were adequate enough, but sufficient cots and hospital stores were often lacking.

The medical officers whom I came in contact with were, as a rule, competent men; but the hospital corps, of which I was in command at several hospitals, were, as a rule, an untrained, careless, shiftless lot of men.

In one hospital where I was on duty the facilities for treating the sick were so poor that on account of a scarcity of bed-pans typhoid fever cases were obliged to walk some fifty yards or so to the sinks.

As a means of preventing such repetition in the future, I would suggest, first, that company officers be instructed by medical officers as to the best means of preserving the health of their commands; second, that one medical officer from each regiment be detailed to inspect his regimental camp at least twice a day, and see that company officers are carrying out the above instructions; that the battalion commanders should be held responsible by the regimental commanders for the sanitary conditions of their battalions, and that schools for non-commissioned officers from time to time should be held by medical officers, and instructions given as to the dangers of camp life; third, that regimental hospitals — except in time of action and as the face of the enemy alters — rather than division hospitals be established, thereby insuring greater comfort to the sick, and removing the necessity for the detail of one or more medical officers for extra regimental duty. Fourth, that more care be taken in the selection of hospital corps men, and a more thorough system of training them be adopted, thereby increasing their sense of responsibility and rendering them of more efficient service to both patient and attending surgeon.

The Eighth Massachusetts, U.S.V., was mustered into the service May 11, 1898. Left the State May 16 for Chickamauga; thence to Lexington, Ky., to Americus, Ga., and from there to Matanzas, Cuba. Reached Boston on its return April 9, 1899, and was mustered out of service April 28, 1899.

From a Private, Eighth Massachusetts, U.S.V.

At Chickamauga the sinks were in the highest part of the camp. Sometimes, when it rained, the sinks were overflowed; and the contents washed down toward the kitchen.

The Third Division, First Army Corps, Hospital at Chickamauga was in a bad location and too small. At one time there were almost twice the number of patients than that for which the hospital was planned to treat.

For months there were no professional or women nurses in the Third Division, First Army Corps, Hospital. The men detailed from the different regiments to act as nurses were incompetent. They were rough and at times even brutal.

In future wars I would suggest that all soldiers, volunteer or regular, be under regular army officers, and that politics have nothing to do with the governing of the armies or the choosing of officers.

These statements are selected from those from members of the First Maine Regiment, U.S.V. This regiment was mustered into the service from May 10 to 13, 1898. It left for Camp Thomas, Chickamauga, May 27. Was under orders to proceed to Porto Rico; but, owing to collapse of Spanish authority in that island, this order was revoked. Returned to the State August 26, and mustered out October 30, 1898.

From a Lieutenant, First Maine, U.S.V.

Our rations were all right as to quantity. I believe them better fitted for a logging crew in the Maine woods in winter than for men in hot weather.

I believe that the principal cause of the suffering of our regiment was from there being so many regiments in the park. All of these men staying there so long, with no sewerage, brought on a terrible condition. I believe the character of the ground unfit for men to live on in large or small numbers. You may not consider me an authority upon this question; but there are plenty of authorities who have stated the effects of camping on a soil which a few inches below the surface is clay marl, and continues to the bed-rock. When you have a rain, the surface changes to heavy mud, and the soil remains damp for a long time. If I understand them correctly, these conditions are unusually favorable to the development of inflammatory rheumatism and malaria, and also colds. The fever was a natural result of the overcrowded condition of the park and the occupying of the place for so long a time.

From a Staff Officer, First Maine, U.S.V.

I cannot say that I think as much was done for our sick as might have been done. The fault was not so much with the general medical department as with those who had charge of hospitals. These were inexperienced, and had everything to learn. Good nurses could not be had. Clumsy fellows detailed from the ranks, ignorant and without habits of personal cleanliness, could not be expected to give the sick the care necessary.

The relief associations aided us much. The hardships of the men in the hospitals would have been beyond description if it had not been for the Red Cross and National Relief Associations.

The Sixth Massachusetts, U.S.V., was mustered into the service May 12, 1898. Left the State May 20 for Camp Alger, Va., then to Charleston, S.C., and from there to Porto Rico. Reached Boston on its return October 27, and mustered out of service, Jan. 21, 1899.

From a Corporal, Sixth Massachusetts, U.S.V.

Was on board the transport "Yale" for eighteen days. No provisions whatever had been made for the troops, part of whom were obliged to be on deck at all times, rain or shine. The whole interior of the vessel was monopolized by the officers and crew. Have slept on deck several times during a drenching rain, with no shelter whatever, whole companies being in the same predicament. Can see no reason why we were exposed to this hardship, as there was plenty of room on board to shelter every man, even the grand salon being unoccupied.

There seems to me no excuse for the shortage of rations, as I afterward found that plenty of potatoes, onions, beans, etc., were stored on board.

The following statements were from nurses and civilians who have personal knowledge of the facts they state:—

From an Army Nurse at Montauk.

I do not know who was to blame for this non-preparation; but it seems to me that these conditions ought to have been avoided, especially as we were within ninety miles of New York City, whence all those things could have been obtained. I know nothing about army red tape, but was told by old soldiers that it was largely to blame for those conditions.

From what I was able to observe, would say that a much larger and much better trained hospital corps would greatly improve army hospital conditions. The old, experienced hospital corps men were, as a rule, valuable and efficient men; but the raw recruits, especially if they had never had any hospital experience, were sadly handicapped. As a rule, they were not to blame. They were willing enough to do, but did not know what to do, nor how to go about what they were directed to do with any degree of comfort to the patient. As a nurse, and at present a student of medicine, I feel safe in making that suggestion, but can offer no other on any other lines.

From an Army Nurse, Camp Wikoff.

Speaking from personal experience, I had very little difficulty in obtaining all that was necessary for my ward, but must admit it was due more to the alert watch kept on the arrival of supplies than from any systematic distribution. It was a case always of "first come, first served," which was, of course, a poor plan, since some wards were sure to be left unsupplied.

From a Prominent Citizen of Worcester, Mass., a Representative of the Volunteer Aid Association of that City.

In reply to question eight would say that, had it not been for the work of the Red Cross and the various volunteer aid associations, there would have been much hardship and much greater suffering at Montauk than did exist; for there would have been the same lack of proper food and of medical supplies that prevailed in Santiago. Had the proper authorities had any comprehension of the actual condition of our soldiers (and it seems difficult to understand why they should not have done so), much of all this might have been prevented; for what was done by these organizations most certainly could have been accomplished by the United States government. Starting with hospital accommodations far short of the exigencies of the existing conditions, there was embarrassment from the outset. Preparations on a more generous scale would have been truer economy in every sense. Under the existing circumstances the doctors and nurses deserve great credit for accomplishing all that they did, for they had much to contend with. In the detention camp, with an exceptional case here and there, there were no floors in the tents, which, coming from a tropical climate as they did, was a hardship for the men. Supplies here were plentiful, owing to the various aid associations, as has been said.

Being a tramp (the only civilian) upon the "Mobile" upon its trip from Santiago to Montauk Point with General Ludlow's brigade, August 13 to 19, there was opportunity afforded to see something of life (and of death) on a transport. The "Mobile" was an excellent battle-ship, and, the soldiers told me, far superior to the transports which took them to Cuba. The ship was well ventilated, having large hatchways and an unusual number of

port-holes, and it had been cleaned and whitewashed ; but, with sixteen hundred to seventeen hundred soldiers on board, the men were very much crowded, and the air in the lower decks quickly became vitiated, and of course remained so throughout the trip. Hammocks were hung so thickly that with the least motion the men occupying them would hit one another. With the men in the crowded, debilitated, and feverish condition that they were, one can imagine the condition of the air in their quarters. Evidently, animal life has quite as high a value as human life ; for, while the soldier was put down below, the horses were given the main deck. This in itself was bad enough ; but it was the privilege of the men — who were quartered directly underneath — to receive the drainage from the leaky floor above, as they lay in their hammocks. The sanitary arrangements on the boat were wretched in the extreme. The water-closets — there were two of them for the enlisted men, one forward and one aft — would each accommodate seven or eight men at a time, and later buckets were pressed into service. There was no further provision for urinals. With these limited accommodations, and with diarrhoea and dysentery almost epidemic, as it was, there was at all times of day a line of ten to twenty in waiting ; and several times men fell fainting where they stood from extreme weakness, and had their evacuations then and there, being unable to wait their opportunity at the closet.

The officers, though crowded, had good state-rooms and the luxury of a bath, there being three tubs at their disposal ; but the lot of a commissioned officer is markedly different from that of the enlisted man. The closets of the enlisted men were flushed twice a day regularly, it is true ; but, even so, they could not be kept in a sanitary condition, and men quartered in sections adjoining these premises might readily breed disease. The "Sick Bay" was aft on the main deck. It was well ventilated ; for it was practically all open overhead and at the ends, only here and there a strip of roof, so there was plenty of air, but also the hot sun pouring down upon the men, or the heavy dews of night or the rain, as the case might be. I am told that at first, after a heavy shower, the men were lifted in their cots, and the cots tilted, so as to let the water run out of them ; but later holes were cut in the canvas for the water to run out, that their beds might be something better than a pond to rest in.

As to proper food for the sick men, there was almost nothing to be had; and what little could be had from the steward (Hughes) was at fabulously high prices. I paid \$3 a bottle for port wine and \$4 a bottle for whiskey for the men. I saw one man give the steward 50 cents for a wine-glass of whiskey. Beef tea never was less than 25 cents a cup; and, as the supply grew less, the price increased. As far as medical supplies went, there seemed to be a marvellous dearth of them. We had been out three days, when a doctor came to me, and asked if I had anything with me to check diarrhoea. Unfortunately, I had not; for I lost my grip in transfer from one transport to the other. In one case, I am told, cough-drops were administered, trusting that the paregoric in them would prove beneficial. The one all-healing cure for every ill, be it whatever it might, was quinine,— that, and that alone.

One of the surgeons of the Second Massachusetts died in Cuba, and another was sick on board. So the care of the whole regiment was left to two doctors, one of whom was a "contract doctor," who was assigned to the regiment in Santiago. It is unnecessary to say they were kept busy morning, noon, and night. The upper forward deck from four or five until nine o'clock in the morning fairly swarmed with men who would crawl up there for a breath of fresh pure air; but by that time the sun was so high and beat down so fiercely upon the deck that most of them had to return to their hammocks, being unable to stand the intense heat, which in many cases affected the men's heads seriously, making them "daffy," to use the expression of the day. There were no awnings on this deck, nor material at hand with which to make any shelter. Fortunately, that voyage was one of calm seas and pleasant skies. Had it been otherwise, who can tell what would have been the story?

The regimental hospital of the Second Massachusetts in Santiago was down at the foot of the hills on the line of the railroad, in rather low land, and about an eighth of a mile from the camp.

The building was right beside the tracks, and looked as though it might have been a freight depot. It was about fifteen by forty feet, and one story high, and was a most dilapidated-looking structure, the doors being all off at the front of it, and the rear being entirely open, the roof in poor repair, and no floor whatever,— merely the ground. If my memory serves me right, there

were but twenty cots there; and they were dirty enough to make one sick.

There were times, I am told, when there were over one hundred in this hospital. Those who could not get cots lay upon their rubber blankets spread upon the ground. There were but two doctors to care for the men at the time of my being there; and the nurses were the men detailed from the companies for that work. I had no knowledge at that time as to the medical supplies, but was told that at one time in this hospital the men went without medical aid for a day and a half. It was at this time that the "contract doctor" came to the rescue of the Second Massachusetts; and he stayed with them until they left Montauk for home, a hard and faithful worker to the end.

From the Father of a Private of the Second Massachusetts.

I went to Camp Wikoff on August 24, and arrived at the camp on the 25th at noon. I went to the detention hospital at once, and found him (my son) very sick and hardly able to talk. I asked him what was the matter,—if they did not treat him well. He said he was treated like a dog on the transport "Mobile" on the way to Camp Wikoff, and was almost starved to death. I stayed with him until after dark (for over two hours); and during that time no nurse and no doctor came to him, and there was during that time no nurse or doctor in the tent, and no light, no one there in that tent but those poor sick boys. The tent was open at both ends, and the cold wind and the fog came up from the water. The condition of the poor boys made my heart ache. I covered up the boys, and inquired about the nurses, the doctor, and their treatment. I then went to General Wheeler's tent, saw two young men outside, and inquired if the general was in. They said he was not, and inquired if they could do anything for me. I told him of the condition at the hospital. An officer, who had been standing near and heard our conversation, came forward, and said, "I do not believe what you have said, and I challenge you to prove it." I told him to come with me, and we went to the hospital. (I do not know who this officer was, but think he must have been an officer on General Wheeler's staff.) He inquired of the boys where their nurse was. They said they did not know. "How long since you have seen him?" They said, "About two

or three hours." He then inquired for their doctor, and they said they had not seen him for five hours. "How long since you have had any nourishment?" and they said, "Five hours." The officer turned to me, and said: "You have not exaggerated it one bit: come with me." We went to the mess-tent; and he called out Dr. Cronon, and inquired of him who had charge of the boys in this tent. He said Dr. Gilhooley had charge of that tent. The officer asked him where he was, and he replied that he did not know. The officer told Dr. Cronon of the condition of the boys in the tent and of his inquiry of the boys and their replies. He wanted to know why they were not better cared for, and the doctor said they were short of nurses and medicines. "How many nurses do you want?" and he replied, "Twenty." The officer said: "This is damnable! You told Secretary Alger only yesterday that you wanted for nothing. Now, if you are short of nurses and medicine to-day, as you state, you were short yesterday, when you told Alger you had plenty, and wanted for nothing! He has gone out, and made his statement to the public; and now this father has come several hundred miles to see his son, and finds him in this condition, and now he will go out and make *his* statement, which will conflict with Secretary Alger's statement." The officer ordered Dr. Cronon to get a light in that tent immediately and get an attendant there at once. These matters were attended to promptly.

Before seeing General Wheeler on this morning, I had passed near the tent where I found my son, just outside the guard line. This was about four o'clock in the morning; and I heard a faint voice calling, "Father, father!" and, looking in the direction of the voice, I saw my poor sick boy sitting outside the tent on a large tin can, in his night-shirt, unattended. The grass was cold and wet as if it had rained all night. I did not dare to go near him, as I was afraid of the guard, as I had no pass. Later in the morning I visited the hospital, and saw a full can of night-soil in the centre of the tent; and the smell was something terrible. The only person in attendance was a young soldier boy, thin and weak, and hardly able to walk. He informed me that he was just out of the hospital himself, and that they had no nurses, and he was doing the best he could for the boys, but he could do but little, as he was so weak. I saw Dr. Gilhooley, and talked with him about Frank; and he called another surgeon or doctor (I do not know

who he was), and they made an examination while I was present, and assured me that Frank was doing well, and would be able to go home by the middle of the next week. Upon this assurance I started for home. Soon after arriving at home I received a telegram to come at once, as Frank was worse. I left on the first train, but he was dead before I got there. The lady nurses had then arrived, and were getting ready for their work. This was Sunday morning, August 28.

Sworn to.

APPENDIX A.

The following was the circular letter sent to the newspapers :—

The Massachusetts Reform Club, in the public interest, has appointed a Committee, consisting of Colonel Charles R. Codman of Boston, Forty-fifth Massachusetts, U.S.V., Civil War, Chairman, Corporal James B. Gardner of Boston, Forty-fifth Massachusetts, U.S.V., Civil War, Samuel Bowles of Springfield, Robert S. Gorham of Newton, Charles Warren of Dedham, Secretary, to receive and put in proper form testimony from the New England States as to the management of the recent war with Spain.

The Committee is not appointed to make an attack upon any person, but to ascertain, and make clear, if possible, to the proper authorities, the causes of the unnecessary suffering of our soldiers during the war, in the hope that by a reform of system or of practice in the management of our army a recurrence of such suffering may be prevented. It therefore appeals to all patriotic citizens to co-operate with it as a matter of duty in this endeavor. The Committee invites communications from all persons who can give information from personal knowledge regarding the following questions :—

The condition of the camps ; of the transports ; of the food supplies ; of the land transportation ; of the hospitals ; and especially regarding the administration of the commissary, the quartermaster and medical departments, and of the quality of the work performed in those departments by those appointed from civil life.

Written statements, sworn to, if possible, may be sent to any member of the Committee, or to Charles Warren, Secretary of War Investigation Committee, 415 John Hancock Building, Boston, Mass., or, on application, the Committee will furnish a list of questions upon which information is especially desired.

All statements received will be carefully preserved and classified, and will be presented by some competent person to the proper authorities.

APPENDIX B.

The Massachusetts Reform Club, in the public interest, has appointed a Committee, consisting of Colonel Charles R. Codman of Boston, Forty-fifth Massachusetts, U.S.V., Civil War, Chairman, Corporal James B. Gardner of Boston, Forty-fourth Massachusetts, U.S.V., Civil War, Samuel Bowles of Springfield, Robert S. Gorham of Newton, Charles Warren of Dedham, Secretary, to receive and present to the proper authorities testimony from the New England States as to the management of the recent war with Spain, in the hope of aiding in ascertaining the causes of the unnecessary suffering of our soldiers during the war, and bringing about a reform of system or of practice in the management of our army, if such are found to be needed.

Will you kindly aid the Committee by answering as many of the following questions as you can, giving as full particulars as possible?

As there may be important points untouched upon in this circular, the Committee will be glad to have you give any facts which you may be able to present as to any unnecessary suffering of our soldiers, and any suggestions as to reforms or methods to prevent recurrence.

Please number your answers, as far as possible, to correspond with the number of the questions. It is desirable, although not absolutely necessary, to have your statement sworn to before a justice of the peace or a notary public. Return in the enclosed stamped envelope to Charles Warren, Secretary of the War Investigation Committee, 415 Hancock Building, Boston, Mass.

1. State name, address, regiment, rank, and service (whether in camp or at the front, or both), also if any previous service, also date of enlistment and of discharge.
2. Describe rations, as to quality and quantity, both in camp and in the field.
3. State particulars regarding method and frequency of inspection of the camp, of rations, of clothing, and of sinks, by field and company officers.
4. Give particulars regarding policing of camps.
5. State what instructions, if any, were given in regard to drinking water, and what violations of such instructions, if any there were, and the reasons therefor.

6. Describe canteen regulations and their locations at the camp.
7. State what instructions, if any, were given in regard to sinks, and how far they were followed; that is, as to location, use, distance from kitchen, etc.
8. State whether there were conditions of hardships at Camp Wikoff which would seem to you avoidable; and, if so, state your reasons.
9. State facts as to the presence or absence of field and line officers with or from their regiments or companies.
10. Describe conditions of transport ships and of car transportation, and unnecessary hardships, if any are known to you, and your reasons for so regarding them.
11. State facts regarding supplies of intrenching tools and ammunition in the field.
12. State quality and quantity of clothing supplied you by the United States government.
13. State particulars as to care of wounded or sick in camp or in the field.
14. State particulars as to condition, size, and adequacy of hospitals, camp, or field, number of cots, supplies of proper medicines, etc.
15. State whether you observed any lack of numbers or of competency in medical officers and attendants; and, if so, give particulars.
16. State any facts showing unnecessary suffering or privation within your personal knowledge.
17. Give any suggestion or recommendation which may occur to you, to prevent future occurrence of such conditions.

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